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1. Introduction 
Analysis of establishment data has shown that wages are higher in older firms, and 
that this relationship survives controlling for size, industry, location, union status 
and other observable firm characteristics [Dunne and Roberts (1990a, 1990b), Davis 
and Haltiwanger (1991), Troske (1998)]. One explanation is that older firms are per-
ceived to have a greater ability to pay higher wages, and doing so is perceived as 
only fair; as a result, older firms find it costly to pay low wages [Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler (1986), Blinder and Choi (1990))]. A second explanation is that older 
firms expect to survive longer than younger firms, so they invest more in training 
[Idson (1996)]. If some of the benefits of this training are transferable to outside em-
ployment, the result is an increase in wages. These explanations are readily tested 
using establishment data.  
Other explanations have focused on the composition of workers in young and old 
firms, the contributions of which cannot be identified from establishment data. In 
particular, employees in older firms have longer tenure and more work experience. 
Worker characteristics might explain all the age effects but, as Brown and Medoff 
(2003) note, they do not constitute true firm-age differentials. Using data on 1,410 
individuals employed in the private sector Brown and Medoff measure the fraction of 
observed firm-age differentials that can be explained by readily observed worker 
characteristics. As expected, tenure and experience play an important role, explaining  
almost half of the firm-age differential. Variations in education, gender, marital 
status, and occupation class, together explain much of the other half. 
After accounting for observable worker characteristics, there is no monotonic rela-
tionship between wages and firm age. Instead, Brown and Medoff identify a -shaped 
relationship in which the lowest wages are paid by firms of intermediate age. This 
finding remains something of a puzzle.  
What might account for such a pattern? We suspect that no one factor can do 
so. Working backward from data to theory, we should be looking for a relation-
ship that can account for new firms paying higher wages that becomes less im-
portant as firms age, and/or a positive wage-age relationship that is muted 
among young firms.  
Brown and Medoff (2003, p. 694) 
This paper suggests a single factor that might explain the -shaped firm-age differen-
tial. Our explanation builds on the following production technology, which is devel-
oped in Section 2. A manager hires n workers. Each worker carries out exactly one 
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unit of work per unit of time, so that n units of work are done in the firm. The value 
of this work depends on the ability of the manager to direct the work that is done, 
each unit of which has a well-defined direction. Conditional on the intended direc-
tion, the actual direction of individual workers depends on the success with which the 
manager organizes his employees; the less directed are the employees, the less pro-
gress they make in the intended direction. For reasons given later, we assume that 
managers of younger firms are (stochastically) less able than managers of older firms 
to provide precise instructions to employees. At the same time, employees differ in 
their propensity to implement managers’ instructions and to act instead on their own 
assessment of the direction work should take. The propensity to implement manag-
ers’ instructions is described by a parameter, a; those least likely to follow instruc-
tions are high-a types. 
We show in Section 3 that the model yields Brown and Medoff’s -shaped function in 
the following manner. In equilibrium, firms with the least ability to direct workers 
are keen to hire high-a types, while firms most able to direct workers strictly prefer 
low-a types. No firm has a strong preference for intermediate-a types. As a conse-
quence, the least able firms bid up the wages at one end of the distribution of a, 
while the most able bid up the wage at the other end. Hence, wages are a -shaped 
function of a, a is inversely related to managerial ability, and managerial ability is 
stochastically increasing in firm age. 
Firm size is determinate in the model in large part because the success with which a 
manager of given ability coordinates work declines as the number of employees under 
his direction rises. This notion has several well-known antecedents. Williamson 
(1967) was the first to introduce the idea that only a fraction, a, of the intentions of 
a manager are carried out by his employees, and that this loss of control sets a limit 
to firm size.1 The model is also related to Becker and Murphy (1992), who explore 
how increasing coordination costs limit the degree of specialization in firms and 
economies.2 Becker and Murphy do not consider a distinct coordination role for man-
agers, although there is nothing in their model specifically to preclude it. The model 
is perhaps most closely related to Lucas (1978). Indeed, the present model can be 
viewed as both a particular interpretation of, and an extension of, the span of control 
                                           
1 The setting is a monitoring problem. See Mirrlees (1976), and Calvo and Wellisz (1978) for 
further refinements. Keren and Levhari (1979) study hierarchies in the context of coordina-
tion. 
2 Becker and Murphy provide numerous examples of how excessive specialization induces ex-
cessive coordination costs and reduces productivity.  
 3 
model. It is an interpretation of Lucas when a does not vary across employees: in 
this case, like Lucas, the model predicts that the best managers operate the largest 
firms, and that labor productivity is invariant to firm size. But, as we show in Sec-
tion 4, these central characteristics of Lucas’ model are not robust to our extension in 
which a varies across individuals. In this latter case, managers of intermediate ability 
may under certain conditions employ the most workers, while labor productivity is a 
-shaped function of firm size.3  
In Section 5 of the paper, we develop our model further to explore its ability to ex-
plain some other intriguing relationships between firm age and size, and labor mar-
kets. Recent research has revealed the following empirical regularities: 
R1. The cross-sectional variance of wages in younger firms is greater than 
the variance in older firms, but less than the variance of self-employment 
earnings [Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger (2008)].4 
R2. Employment in small and young firms is positively associated with en-
try into self-employment [Boden (1996), Wagner (2004), Elfenbein et al. 
(2008)], and with self-employment success [Elfenbein et al. (2008)].5 
R3. Entrants into self-employment are drawn predominantly from the upper 
and lower ends of the wage distribution. This finding holds overall, as well 
as separately in large [older] and small [younger] firms. [Elfenbein et al. 
(2008)]. 
To explore whether our model is consistent with these regularities, we add a second 
dimension to employee heterogeneity, and we add some simple dynamics with a 
three-period model. When employees ignore their manager’s instructions they vary in 
the quality of their own decisions. High-a employees who improve on the instructions 
they are given are high ability – colloquially, they can be said to exhibit initiative. 
High-a employees who do worse are lower ability and considered as merely insubor-
                                           
3 Others, such as Jovanovic (1994), have extended Lucas’ model in reasonable ways and over-
turned some key results. 
4 Elfenbeim at al. relate the variances to firm size but they do not condition on firm age, so 
the relationship also holds unconditionally for age. The greater variance of self-employment 
earnings has been documented in numerous other studies, including Hamilton (2000), Rosen 
and Willen (2002), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), and Åstebro, Chen and Thomp-
son (2008), 
5 Elfenbeim et al. (2008) again analyze only size effects. Wagner (2004) analyzes size and age 
effects and concludes that the latter is more important. 
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dinate. In the first period, incumbent firms employ workers knowing only the em-
ployee’s a; they can identify the worker’s propensity to follow instructions, but they 
cannot distinguish between initiative and insubordination. At the end of the first pe-
riod, however, each employee’s ability is revealed, so in the second period the offered 
wage is adjusted. In the third period, workers choose whether to enter self-
employment. 
The predictions of the model relate to the regularities given above as follows: 
R1. In the second period, the largest wage increases are captured by em-
ployees with initiative, while the largest declines are suffered by the insub-
ordinate. The ability of low-a employees is unimportant to the firm, so their 
wage does not adjust much. As high-a employees are concentrated in young 
firms, wage adjustments are larger in young and small firms. In the second 
period, therefore, the variance of wages is greater in young firms. 
R2. Leaving the current employer is preferred only by the insubordinate in 
small firms, and by workers with initiative employed by large firms. Nu-
merical calculations suggest that small firms produce more self-employed 
than do large firms, and both produce more than intermediate-sized firms.  
R3. Entrants into self-employment are drawn predominantly from the lower 
end of the distribution of wages in small firms and from the upper end of 
the distribution in large firms. 
2. The Production Technology 
A firm employs n workers, each of whom does one unit of work per period. How pro-
ductive this work is depends upon how well each employee’s activity is aligned with a 
particular strategy. The degree of alignment is a random variable, and the expected 
distance between the strategy and the activity depends upon the firm’s ability to 
align its employee activities with its preferred strategy. The firm’s ability to do so 
depends upon four factors: the number of employees, the manager’s ability to provide 
precise directions to his employees, the employees’ propensity to follow these direc-
tions, and the ability of employees to divine the correct activity whenever they fail to 
follow directions as given.  
Figure 1 illustrates the implementation of this idea for 3n = . Each of three workers 
carries out one unit of work, indicated by segments x1, x2 and x3. We shall normalize 
the length of a unit of work to be equal to 2A. The contribution of this work toward 
firm output depends upon the relation between the direction of strategy, which is 
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normalized to consist of an attempt to move as far along the horizontal axis as possi-
ble, and the direction of the worker’s effort. The contribution of worker 1, for exam-
ple, is given by the length of the horizontal segment y1, and firm output is given by 
3
1i i
Y y== å . As each of the line segments xi has length 2A, the contribution of 
worker i to output is given by ( )2 cosi iy A q= . In order that no worker contributes a 
negative amount, we assume that (in radians) / 2 / 2
i
ip q p- £ £ " , so 
0,2
i
y A ié ùÎ "ê úë û . 
Assume that each cos( )
i
q  is a random draw from the uniform distribution with posi-
tive support on the interval [0, ]a . The parameter a is our measure of the firm’s abil-
ity to align employee activities with strategy. If it did not vary with the number of 
workers to be directed, expected output for a firm with n workers would be 
[ ; , ] [ ; ]E Y a n nE y a= , indicating constant returns to scale. Consequently, the best 
manager would employ all the workers and produce all the output. We introduce di-
minishing returns with the simple parameterization ( ) /a n ng bl= , where 0l >  is 
an index of the quality of decisions being made in the firm. Both g and b lie in the 
unit interval. 
Our assumption that cos( )
i
q  is a draw from the uniform distribution yields a familiar 
production function. Expected profit is  
 ( )
0
2
| )
n
Anx
E s dx w n
n
g bl
g bp al
-
-
é ù = -ê úë û ò , 
x1
1
x3
x2
Yy1
y2
y3 Output
3
2
FIGURE 1. The production technology. 
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            ( )1A n w ng bl a-= - , (1) 
Assume that each firm has one manager/owner, and let [0,1]s Î  denote his ability. 
There is a continuum of firms of unit mass, with abilities drawn from the distribution 
( )
s
F s , with density ( )
s
f s . There is also a continuum of workers of mass m. Workers 
vary in their propensity to follow their own ideas rather than their manager’s in-
structions. We index this propensity by [0,1]a Î , and denote its population distribu-
tion as ( )Fa a . We shall refer to a as a measure of the worker’s character. Just like 
managers, workers also vary in their ability to make decisions. We denote their abil-
ity by [0,1]v Î , and assume that it is a draw from the known distribution ( )
v
F v . A 
worker’s type is therefore defined by the 2-tuple {a, v}. All distributions are assumed 
to be continuous, so there are no mass points.  
The parameters s, a, and v are related to firm performance in the following way. As-
sume a firm has a manager with ability s, and hires n workers with characters 
i
a  
and abilities 
i
v . Then the firm type is 
 1 1
1 1
(1 )
n n
i i i
i i
sn n vl a a- -
= =
= - +å å . (2) 
We assume throughout the paper that each firm does not employs workers with dif-
ferent characters, so (2) can be written as 
 1
1
(1 )
n
i
i
s n vl a a -
=
= - + å . (3) 
While there is a perhaps an appearance of novelty to the production function, it is a 
quite standard technology. Expected firm output is governed by a Cobb-Douglas ag-
gregator with firm human capital, l, and raw labor hours, n, as the only inputs. Firm 
human capital depends upon managerial ability and the workers’ types. One would 
suppose that part of the firm’s human capital, and hence its expected performance, 
can be predicted from observable characteristics of managers and founders [e.g., 
Bates (1990), Colombo, Delmastro, and Grilli (2004), Åstebro and Bernhardt (2005)], 
part from observable characteristics of the firm itself [e.g., Dunne, Roberts, and 
Samuelson (1988, 1989), among many others], and part from observable characteris-
tics of employees [e.g., Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), Brown and Medoff 
(2003)]. Of course, the actual performance of the firm and the earnings of its employ-
ees will contain a significant unpredictable component, because output contains a 
stochastic component and because s and {a, v} are not predetermined by observ-
ables. Indeed, Abowd et al. conclude that person effects, especially effects unrelated 
 7 
to observables, are a very important source of wage variation. 
3. The -shaped Relationship between Firm Age and Wages 
In this section, we shall also assume that ( )
v
F v  is degenerate, so v v=  for all em-
ployees, allowing us to define the firm’s type by 
 (1 )s vl a a= - + . (4) 
Let ( )w a  denote the wage paid to a workers, and normalize the price of output to 
unity. The firm maximizes (1) by choosing the number of workers, n, and employee 
character, a.  
The first-order condition for firm size is6 
       (1 ) ( )n wg bb l a-- = , (5) 
If all workers had the same character, a , earning the same wage, ( )w a , optimal em-
ployment would be proportional to ( ) /(1 )s v g ba a- + . But as ( )Fa a  is not degener-
ate, two countervailing forces induce a deviation of firm size from this simple solu-
tion. On the one hand, firms can raise a to ameliorate the consequences of a low s or 
reduce a to enhance the advantages of a high s. This effect tends to convexify n(s). 
On the other hand, as we shall see, wages are higher in the tails of the distributions 
(of a and s), and this force operates on employment in the opposite direction. In gen-
eral, however, n(s) is an increasing function, consistent with Lucas’ (1978) result that 
firm size is increasing in managerial ability. However, the precise form that n(s) takes 
depends upon assumptions about the form of the distributions. 
The first-order condition for employee character is 
   1 1 ( ) ( )n v s w ng bgl a- - ¢- = . (6) 
A sufficient condition for (6) to be optimal is that w(a) is convex; we will now show 
that this is the case in an equilibrium assignment of workers to managers.  
The worst [best] managers prefer to employ high [low] a employees, and this implies 
a non-monotonicity in the wage schedule. To see why, note first that continuity of all 
distributions imply that an interior solution for a must hold for almost all s. Imagine 
that, to the contrary, a manager with ability s interior to the domain of ( )
s
F s  pre-
ferred to hire workers of type 0a = . Then every manager with ability s s¢ ³  also 
                                           
6 Given the restriction on b, the second-order condition is always satisfied. 
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prefers 0a = . This creates a mass point of demand for workers of type 0a = , but 
continuity of ( )Fa a  precludes the existence of such a mass point. Similarly if man-
ager s prefers 1a = , so do all managers with s s¢ £  creating an untenable mass 
point of demand at 1a = . Next, for (5) to define an interior solution it must be the 
case that sgn[ ( )] sgn[ ]w v sa¢ = - . That is, wages are locally increasing in a for the 
types of workers hired by low-ability managers, and locally decreasing in a for the 
types of workers hired by high-ability managers. The intuition here is also straight-
forward: if wages were not locally increasing, all managers of type s v<  with em-
ployees of given character a could increase profits by raising a; the wage must in-
crease at a sufficient rate to make the current a optimal. Similarly, all managers of 
type s v>  can increase profits by reducing a unless wages fall with a at a sufficient 
rate. Finally, firms with low s employ high-a workers, and this yields the first propo-
sition: 
PROPOSITION 1. (i) w(a) is a -shaped function; (ii) w(s) is a -shaped function. 
To go from here to Brown and Medoff’s (2003) result, we need only relate s to firm 
age. We shall not do so formally: we shall simply assume that the distribution of s 
can be written as ( | )sF s a , where a is firm age and sF  is decreasing in a. We offer 
two justifications for this assumption; they do not strike us as especially contentious. 
The first is a simple managerial learning-by-doing story. As is the case for employees, 
managers in young firms have less tenure and less experience, and their relative inex-
perience makes them less able to manage effectively, The second is a firm learning 
story. Young firms, especially in high-tech industries, frequently have less well-
defined strategies and fewer established routines than older firms. In such environ-
ments, precise direction of workers is more difficult, even holding managerial ability 
constant.7  
COROLLARY 1. The wage is a -shaped function of firm age.  
We can say a little more about the wage function if we are willing to make a narrow 
assumption about the assignment of worker characters to manager ability. Eliminat-
ing n from (5) and (6) yields a first-order differential equation for the wage function, 
                                           
7 The absence of well-defined routines may provide young firms with a comparative advantage 
in activities for which routines are less valuable. For example, Berger et al. (2002) note that 
small banks are more likely to specialize in lending to businesses in which information is 
“soft”. 
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 ( )
( )
'( ) ( ) 0
(1 ) (1 )
v s
w w
A s v
ga ab a a
-- =- - + , (7) 
the solution to which depends upon the relationship between s and a. We proceed by 
assuming an assignment in which there is a one to one mapping, s a . Both s and 
a are defined on the unit interval, so for purposes of illustration we let this assign-
ment be 1s a= - .8  
Substituting 1s a= -  into (7) and solving the differential equation yields a wage 
function, 
 
( ) ( )2( 1)1 2(4 )tan ln (1 )
( ) exp
2(1 )(1 ) 4
v
v v
v v
w c
v
ag g a a
a bb
+ --
-
ì üï ïï ï+ -ï ïï ï= ⋅ +í ýï ï-- -ï ïï ïï ïî þ
, (8) 
where the constant c will depend, inter alia, on the parameters of the model and the 
measure of available workers, m. The function is, of course, -shaped. Figure 2 illus-
trates some plots for various values of / (1 )x g b= - . The figure plots ( )/ ( )w ca ⋅  for 
an arbitrarily fixed value of c; as c in fact varies when the parameters change, the 
                                           
8 This is not an innocuous assumption: it requires that (1 ) ( ) ( )
s
f s n s f sa - =  for all s. More gen-
0.5x =
1x =
1.5x =
w() / c( )

.
FIGURE 2. Numerical plots of the wage function: Parameter values are 
v =0.5, c=1, and three values of g/(1-b). 
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apparent shifts in the function as / (1 )g b-  changes are uninformative. The func-
tions have their minima at 0.5a = , because given our simple assignment this is the 
point at which s v= . When s and v  are equal, the firm is indifferent about the 
value of a; it will therefore choose to hire the workers with the lowest wage. The fig-
ure also shows that the wage function is steeper when a is high than when it is low, 
and this asymmetry is stronger when / (1 )g b-  is larger. The intuition is straight-
forward: when s is small, the marginal product of l is greater, so changes in a have a 
greater effect on output. Finally, note that if s is distributed reasonably uniformly on 
the unit interval, then the inter-firm variance of wages among the group of small 
firms (say, those with 2 / 3a > ), exceeds the variance among large firms ( 2 / 3a < ) 
which in turn exceeds the variance of firms of intermediate size.  
Figure 3 plots the relationship between firm size and wages for two values of A and 
c. Managerial ability s, is zero at the left-hand end of each curve, and equal to one at 
the right. Employment in every firm is proportional to 1/( / )A c b  while from (8) the 
wage function is proportional to c but independent of A. Thus, if the measure of 
available workers, m, is fixed, any technological advance that increases A is matched 
by an equal increase in c; the wage function shifts upward keeping employment con-
stant in every firm. In contrast, if the supply of workers is perfectly elastic, then c is 
                                           
erally, the assignment takes the form ( )s g a=  for some decreasing function g that depends on 
the distributions of abilities and worker characteristics. 
FIGURE 3. Numerical plots of the wage as a function of firm 
size. Parameter values are v =0.5, g=0.5, b=0.5, and two 
values of A and c.  
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unchanged and the wage-employment curve shifts to the right. 
4. Coordination and the Span of Control Model 
When there is no variation in a, the production technology is a particular implemen-
tation of Lucas’ (1978) span of control model. We know from Lucas that, in this case, 
the most able managers employ more workers and their firms earn greater profits. 
We also know that output per worker is invariant to managerial ability, because good 
managers exploit their skills by increasing the number of workers they manage rather 
than maintaining higher productivity of workers. These results need not hold when a 
varies across workers and firms. This section shows how the implications of the pre-
sent model differ from the well-known results in Lucas, continuing with the assign-
ment 1s a= - .   
• Managerial ability and firm size. A key result in Lucas is that the best managers 
operate the largest firms as measured by employment. Somewhat surprisingly, this 
result does not always hold in the present model. Using (4), (5), and (8), firm size 
satisfies 
 
( )
( ) ( )
1/1/ 1/
2 )1 2
(4 )1/
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( )
tan ln (1 )
exp
2 (1 )(1 ) 4
v s
v v
A s s s v
n s
v s v s
c
v
bb b
b
b
g g
b bb b
--
-
- - + -= ì üï ïï ï- +ï ïï ï+í ýï ï-- -ï ïï ïï ïî þ
, (9) 
from which it is easy to verify that  
 { } { }sgn ( ) sgn (2 1)n s v sb b¢ = - - . (10)  
If 1(2 )vb -£ - , it follows that n(s) is a strictly increasing function for all [0, 1],s Î  
so in this case the model replicates Lucas’ central result. As 1 b-  is the elasticity of 
output with respect to employment, we would typically expect 12 ,b >  so this re-
striction on b usually holds. But when it does not, there exists an * 1s <  such that 
n(s) is increasing for any *[0, )s sÎ  but decreasing in s for any *( , 1].s sÎ  Figure 4 
plots some examples.9 When a is invariant and the wage is therefore constant, the 
standard span of control model predicts that employment is strictly increasing in s;  
 
                                           
9 One’s intuition should be that n rises more rapidly with managerial ability when b is small, 
and the plots are consistent with intuition. 
 12 
at the same time, a decline [rise] in the wage induces an increase [a reduction] in firm 
size. Thus, in the present model, employment rises quite rapidly with managerial 
ability when .s v£  When ,s v>  increases in employment in response to increases in 
managerial ability are offset by the countervailing force of a wage that rises as a de-
clines. For sufficiently large s, the countervailing force may dominate, and this is 
more likely when the elasticity, 1 ,b-  is small.  
• Managerial ability and firm profits. Despite the potential non-monotonic relation-
ship between managerial ability and optimal employment, it is easy to verify that 
expected profits are an increasing function of s regardless of the value of b and v . 
This is an intuitive result: if it were not, high-ability entrepreneurs could match the 
firm size of low-ability entrepreneurs and still outperform them. Figure 5 illustrates. 
The plots show convex functions, but this depends on parameter values. If v  is small 
and b sufficiently larger than g, the function may be s shaped, with a concave por-
tion appearing when / ( ).s v b b g> -   
• Labor productivity and firm size. Expected output per worker is 
 ( )1 [ | ] ( ) (1 )n E Y s A n s s s svb g-- é ù= - +ê úë û , (11) 
where n(s) is given by (9). It is easy to verify that 
Fi
rm
 s
iz
e,
 n
(s
)
Managerial ability, s
b =0.5
b =0.7
b =0.6
b =0.8
FIGURE 4. Managerial ability and optimal employment. Pa-
rameter values are v =0.5, g=0.5, c=1, A=15, and four values 
of b. 
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 { }
1 [ | ]
sgn sgn
d n E Y s
s v
ds
-ì üé ùï ïï ïê úë ûï ï = -í ýï ïï ïï ïî þ
, (12) 
so output per worker exhibits a -shape with respect to managerial ability. Except 
for the (infrequent) cases in which 1(2 ) ,vb -> -  this implies that labor productivity 
in the largest and smallest firms, and in the youngest and oldest firms, is greater 
than in firms of intermediate age and size. 
5. Variations in Ability and Self-Employment Choices 
In this section, we allow ability, v, to vary across workers in addition to with their 
character, a.  However, at the time workers are hired, managers are unable to ob-
serve ability, which is revealed only after the passage of some time. If worker i is re-
vealed to have low [high] ability, he is revealed to be less [more] valuable than is mer-
ited by his initial wage. A firm would then prefer to dismiss a low-ability worker or 
reduce his wage, and it may be willing to increase the wage it pays to high-ability 
workers if doing so is necessary to retain them. In this subsection, we explore how 
information about worker ability affects the maximum wage a firm is willing to pay, 
focusing in particular on how revisions in the wage vary with s.  
We shall first proceed with some simplifying assumptions, leaving a more complete 
analysis to a numerical example. First, we restrict attention for the moment to the 
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 p
ro
fit
Managerial ability, s
b =0.5
b =0.7
b =0.6
b =0.8
FIGURE 5. Managerial ability and expected profits. Pa-
rameter values are v =0.5, g=0.5, c=1, A=15, and four 
values of b. 
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special case in which all workers in the economy have the same character, a a= , 
and we let w  denote the wage paid to a worker whose ability is known only to be a 
draw from ( )
v
F v , with mean v . Second, we assume that firms initially hire workers 
as though they all had ability 
i
v v= , so that we can make use of the solution 
( ) // (1 )n s v g bg bml m a a= º - + , where ( )1/(1 )w bm b= - .10 After hiring under the 
assumption that l l= , firms observe individual abilities and they note that this 
changes their realization of l.  
To see how realizations of an individual’s ability affects revenues, consider first a 
small departure of vi from v . That is, while workers were hired under the assump-
tion that (1 )s vl a a= - + , we then define 
 
( 1)
(1 ) i
n v v
s
n
l a a
æ ö- + ÷ç ÷ç= - + ÷ç ÷÷çè ø
, (13) 
and allow vi  to change. Substituting 
/n g bml=  into the expected revenue function, 
 
( )1/
0
2
| )
A x
E R dx
g b g bl m l g b
g
ml
l l
- - -
é ù =ê úë û ò . (14) 
and differentiating with respect to individual i’s ability yields 
 ( 1 2 / )
|
i
i
v v
dE R
dv
g g bl kl - + +
=
é ùê úë û = , (15) 
where k  is a positive constant. The absolute change in revenues occasioned by a 
change in vi is is larger when s is small, reflecting the fact that the marginal produc-
tivity of employee ability is higher when managers are less able. As managerial abil-
ity is inversely related to firm size and age, it follows that the variance of offered 
wages after observing ability is larger in smaller and younger firms, consistent with 
the evidence summarized in regularity R1.  
PROPOSITION 2. After individual abilities are revealed, the variance of wages is 
greater in smaller and younger firms.  
                                           
10 The correct approach expresses expected output as the n-fold convolution of individual 
worker outputs. With n endogenous (and treated as a continuous variable in this paper), the 
correct approach is intractable. 
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Proposition 2 is Wages are more sensitive to individual ability when a is large. As a 
is larger in smaller firms, one would expect that the inverse relationship just obtained 
between the variance of wages and firm size would be enhanced when we allow a to 
vary in a manner consistent with optimal behavior. Complicating this effect, how-
ever, is the fact that wages adjust with a. We examine the net effects of these coun-
tervailing forces by means of our numerical example. Define 
 ( | ) | ( , , ( )) | ( , ( ))
i i
v s E R v s s E R s sl a l aé ù é ùD = -ê ú ê úë û ë û  (16) 
as the change in revenue induced by a change in employee i’s ability from v  to vi, 
when a varies across individuals, individuals are matched to firms according to 
1s a= - , and both ( )w a  and n are determined endogenously. Equation (16) com-
pares the revenues that are obtained from having individual i with his revealed abili-
ties, or replacing him with a new employee of the same character but with ability v .   
The maximum wage the firm is willing is pay after observing vi is 
 ˆ( | ) ( | ) ( ( ))
i i
w v s v s w sa= D + . (17) 
That is, the firm will pay a wage that differs from that paid to a worker with average 
ability by at most the difference between the revenues that are expected from em-
ploying each of the two workers. Figure 6 plots examples of equation (17) for firms 
with differing managerial abilities. When 1s = , individual i’s ability has no bearing 
FIGURE 6. The maximum offered wage as a function of vi for 
firms with differing managerial ability. Parameter values are 
v =0.5, g=0.5, b=0.5, A=10, and c=1. 
w(vi)
vi
s=0
s=0.25
s=0.5
s=0.75
s=1
^
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on his wage, because in this case individual i has character 0a =  and simply does 
what he is instructed to do. Hence, in the largest firms, there is no variance in wages. 
As s declines (and hence as firm size and age decline), the sensitivity of the wage to 
individual ability increases, just as in the special case analyzed previously. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the maximum wage the firm is willing to offer to the least able workers 
becomes negative for the least able managers (and hence in the smallest and youngest 
firms).11 This result turns on the difference between the marginal products of ability 
for fixed n and of n for fixed ability. The former generally exceeds the latter, but it is 
the latter that determines the wage that is paid to a new hire.  
The analysis of entry into self-employment is now straightforward. After experiencing 
a change in wages, the worker reassesses his options. He may remain in his current 
job, seek new employment, or enter self-employment. However, seeking new employ-
ment is unattractive. Firms only hire workers of identical character, so employment 
prospects exist only with managers having the same ability as the worker’s current 
manager. If his current wage is observable to outside firms, then the worker can do 
no better elsewhere. If his current wage is not observable, there is an adverse selec-
tion problem. For any wage offered by an outside firm, the only applicants for the 
position are workers who will do better by moving. But these are workers that are 
unprofitable to hire at the offered wage, so the offered wage is reduced. Then, the 
only wage offered is equal to the wage paid to a worker with ability known to be 
zero, and no workers move. Thus, the only alternative to remaining with the current 
employer is to enter self-employment.  
If the agent enters self-employment, he draws a random ability from the distribution 
( | 0, )
s i
F s a v= , where Fs is decreasing in vi. Suppose that entry into self-employment 
requires financing such that the agent retains only a fraction, fof the profits, and 
assume that | 0, ( | )E a v w v vf p aé ù= < =ê úë û  for all a; this ensures that wage employ-
ment was initially more attractive than self-employment. After learning vi, workers 
enter self-employment if ˆ| 0, ( | )
i i
E a v w v sf pé ù= >ê úë û . Figure 7 superimposes the func-
tion | 0,
i
E a vf pé ù=ê úë û  onto the maximum offered wages from Figure 6 for the simple 
case where each agent’s ability as a manager is identical to his ability as a worker. 
The profit function is convex and bounded above zero for all abilities. Unsurprisingly, 
the insubordinate -- low-ability workers in small and young firms – choose self-
employment over continued wage work. But in addition, some high-ability workers in 
 
                                           
11 That is, workers who prove to be sufficiently insubordinate may be driven out of the labor 
market even in the absence of alternatives offering positive income. 
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large firms choose self-employment because they are low-a types and therefore are 
not rewarded for their ability. These workers can make better use of their ability by 
managing their own firms. Thus, given the correlation between age and size, the self-
employed are drawn from the tails of the firm age and size distributions, which is 
consistent with the evidence in Elfenbein et al. (2008) 
PROPOSITION 3. Entry into self-employment is more likely from the tails of the em-
ployer size and distributions, and especially from small and young firms. 
Selection into self-employment induces a somewhat subtle relationship between wages 
and subsequent entry into self-employment than was reported in Elfenbein et al. The 
self-employed that came from small firms were previously low paid, and had previ-
ously suffered a decline in their wages. The self-employed that came from large firms 
were previously more highly paid than their colleagues and had enjoyed an increase, 
albeit a modest one, in their wages. However, they were not the highest paid workers 
overall, which position is occupied by workers with initiative who are employed by 
small firms.  
 
s=0
s=0.5
s=0.75
s=1
E[]
v,s
w, E[]
FIGURE 7. The wages and expected self-employment earnings as 
a function of vi Parameter values are v =0.5, g=0.5, b=0.5, 
A=10, c=1, f=0.025, and si=vi. The bold line is expected self-
employment earnings. Double-lines represent segments of wages 
for which self-employment is preferred. 
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PROPOSITION 4. (i) Self-employed individuals from small firms previously were low 
wage earners and had suffered a decline in wages (ii) Self-employed individuals 
from large firms previously were high wage earners among employees of large 
firms, but intermediate earners among all workers; they had previously experi-
enced increases in their wage.  
6. Conclusions 
We have modeled a simple production technology in which managers must coordinate 
the activities of employees, and their success depends on both the manager’s ability 
and the type of workers he employees. We have shown how this simple framework 
provides a unified explanation for the -shaped relationship between firm age and 
wages, and for some recent and somewhat subtle relationships between firm age, size, 
and entry into entrepreneurship. The model builds on some well-established ideas, 
most notably on how limited control of employees can limit the size of the firm [cf. 
Williamson (1967) and Lucas (1978)]. Nonetheless, the ability of this paper’s imple-
mentation of these ideas to explain some recent empirical results on earnings and 
employment choices suggests there remains much more that we might learn from 
continuing to model production technologies with explicit managerial functions. 
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